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Abstract Finetuning and Naturalness are extra-empirical theory assessments
that reflect our expectation how scientific theories should provide an intuitive
understanding about the foundations underlying the observed phenomena. Re-
cently, the absence of new physics at the LHC and the theoretical evidence
for a multiverse of alternative physical realities, predicted by our best funda-
mental theories, have casted doubts about the validity of these concepts. In
this essay we argue that the discussion about Finetuning should not predom-
inantly concentrate on the desired features a fundamental theory is expected
to have, but rather on the question what a theory needs to qualify as funda-
mental in the first place. By arguing that a fundamental description of the
Universe should possess zero entropy, we develop a ’holistic’ concept for the
most fundamental layer of reality: The fundamental description of the Universe
is the Universe itself, understood as an entangled quantum state. Adopting a
universal applicability of quantum mechanics, in this framework the behavior
of subsystems can be understood as the perspectival experience of an entan-
gled quantum Universe perceived through the ”lens of decoherence”. In this
picture the fundamental reality is non-local, and finetuned coincidences in ef-
fective theories may be understood in a way similar to EPR-correlations. This
notion provides a fresh view on the topic of Naturalness and Finetuning since
it suggests that Finetuning problems and hints for anthropic explanations are
an artifact of theories building up on subsystems rather than on the fundamen-
tal description. Recent work in quantum gravity aiming at an understanding
of spacetime geometry from entanglement entropy could be interpreted as a
first sign of such a paradigm shift.
Keywords Naturalness · Finetuning · Multiverse · Many Worlds Interpreta-
tion · Entanglement · Fundamental Theory
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1 Introduction
Considering its range of validity, its mathematical rigor and the sheer number
and immense accuracy of its experimentally verified predictions, the Standard
Model of particle physics easily qualifies as the most successful theory in the
entirety of science. At the same time, however, the Standard Model is also
plagued with various Finetuning problems, understood in the remainder of
the paper as follows:
Finetuning describes unlikely coincidences on an effective level of descrip-
tion which are expected to be explained by a more fundamental theory.
Such unlikely coincidences in the Standard Model include:
1. The gauge hierarchy problem: The question why the Higgs mass is so much
lighter than the cutoff scale of the Standard Model, arguably the Planck
scale, corresponding to the unlikely cancellation of quantum corrections to
the Higgs mass at the level of 1 : 1017 [1].
2. The cosmological constant or dark energy problem: The question why the
vacuum energy of the Universe is so tiny, i.e. 56-120 orders of magnitude
smaller than what would be expected by simple quantum field theory es-
timates [2].
3. The strong CP problem: The question why the CP violating θ-term arising
naturally in Quantum Chromodynamics is so small [3].
4. The question why the relic density of dark matter is in the same ball park
as the relic density of baryons [4].
In the history of science, such coincidences have always sparked curiosity,
and inspired the search for explanations. In this spirit, an overwhelming ma-
jority of particle physicists had aspired to new physics at the TeV scale such as
supersymmetry or large extra dimensions that could potentially ameliorate or
solve the gauge hierarchy problem and provide a candidate for dark matter to
resolve problem 4 - a strategy perceived as becoming increasingly unattractive
after the LHC has been running and probing the TeV scale for a decade without
finding any physics beyond the Standard Model. Opinions about what these
results implicate for the state and future of fundamental physics differ widely.
For one, the present situation has sparked a debate whether ”extra-empirical
theory assessments” such as simplicity, falsifiability, Naturalness, calculabil-
ity, or elegance are reliable guiding principles in the quest for a fundamental
theory. It is argued whether unnatural theories can be considered to be less
attractive as long as no fundamental knowledge about underlying probability
distributions exists - with more [5] or less optimistic [6] conclusions about the
relevance of Finetuning and Naturalness.
As an alternative, it has become increasingly popular to resort to anthropic
explanations justified by various notions of a multiverse of physical realities.
Proponents of this idea often argue that Finetuning is no problem in the first
place since String Theory predicts a multiverse allowing for any set of phys-
ical parameters to be realized somewhere among the 10500 or more vacua in
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the String Theory ”landscape” [7,8,9]. The latter assumption invites for an-
thropic reasoning, i.e. the speculation that the features of our cosmic environ-
ment can’t be traced back to a fundamental theory but rather are contingent
upon the condition that they allow conscious observers to evolve. Such reason-
ing is, however, extremely controversial: It has been dismissed, for example,
with characterizations such as ”multiverse mania” [10], ”Multiverse madness”
[11], ”entirely metaphysical in nature” [12], and the ”most dangerous idea in
physics” [13], to quote a few.
On one hand this sentiment is obviously plausible, since anthropic reason-
ing can prevent a true understanding of phenomena in terms of an underlying
theory. On the other hand the existence of a multiverse seems almost in-
evitable. After all, even if String Theory (and the more so the landscape) is
at the present stage an extremely ambitious, rudimentary and hypothetical
scenario for a theory of everything, the multiverse emerges already in stan-
dard quantum mechanics, the paradigm underlying not only the Standard
Model of particle physics but almost almost any branch of modern physics:
Understanding quantum mechanics in the most straightforward and conserva-
tive way as a universally valid theory about Nature, it predicts the parallel
realities corresponding to various Everett branches known the ”Many Worlds
Interpretation” 1. In fact, it has been argued recently that the String The-
ory landscape and the many worlds multiverse could be one and the same
thing, known as the ”ER=EPR conjecture” [14,15,16,17]. What is often over-
looked in this context, however, is that the quantum multiverse is an emergent
property of a fundamental Universe [18]. This latter observation has crucial
consequences for our understanding of the fundamental reality. As a conse-
quence, we should accept that it is very likely that the multiverse exists, but
focus on the physics beyond the multiverse and ponder whether this may be
relevant for the Finetuning problems of the Standard Model.
In this paper we thus will suggest a fourth avenue: It is argued that not
so much the desired properties of a fundamental theory are relevant in this
endeavor but rather the question what qualifies a theory as fundamental in
the first place. In the following we thus will adopt the assumption that the
multiverse is inevitable but emergent and discuss what this understanding
implies for the notion of a fundamental description of Nature. We will start
with a discussion of ”what is fundamental?” (this part is largely identical to
the author’s entry in the FQXi essay contest of the same name [19]) before
we come back to the question of what this notion means for the quest for a
fundamental theory and the interpretation of the Finetuning problem. After
all, if Finetuning describes unlikely coincidences on an effective level of de-
scription which are expected to be explained by a more fundamental theory,
1 More concretely: To avoid the conclusion that different Everett branches exist one
would have to either alter quantum mechanics for example by adding a process giving rise
to a physical collapse, which typically is in conflict with special relativity, or by interpret-
ing quantum mechanics as a theory about knowledge rather than a theory about Nature,
assigning it to the realm of humanities rather than science.
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the question how this fundamental theory looks like is a crucial ingredient in
any solution.
2 Baryogenesis, Neutrino Mass and the Cosmological Abundance
of Dark Matter
In a nutshell, the basic idea advocated in this essay is that what looks like an
unlikely coincidence when observing a subsystem may be resolved by observing
the the total system instead. To illustrate this point, we will first discuss an
example where this finding applies and which is totally unrelated to the topic
of quantum foundations discussed later on.
The example presented combines several open questions in particle physics
such as the generation of neutrino mass and the origin of the cosmic baryon
asymmetry instead, and it is related to what in the good old days of the late
1990ies - before the advent of dark energy - was known as the ”cosmological
finetuning problem” [20], i.e. problem 4.
Neutrino masses are generally understood as the first laboratory hint for
particle physics beyond the Standard Model, and the reason is that they are
deeply connected with the question whether lepton number is violated or
conserved. Neutrino masses can be realized in two general ways, either the
neutrino is coupled to a new, gauge singlet right-handed neutrino, LDirac =
mDνLνR+hc, or to its own anti-particle, LMajorana = mMνLν
c
R
. While the lat-
ter option violates lepton number, giving rise to various new processes forbid-
den in the Standard Model, the second option does not. It introduces, however,
a new particle νR whose Majorana mass L
′
Majorana = mMνRν
c
L
is allowed by
the Standard Model gauge symmetry. This mass term would also violate lep-
ton number, implying that the discovery of neutrino masses either implies that
lepton number is broken or that there is some new symmetry or principle guar-
anteeing lepton number conservation and thereby forbiding the right-hganded
Majorana mass L′Majorana. The most popular neutrino mass models assume
that lepton number indeed is violated since this allows for elegant explanations
why the neutrino mass is so small, such as the various versions of the seesaw
mechanism [22]. Lepton number violation can be cosmologically dangerous,
though. Understood as breaking of the anomaly-free combination B − L, it
can erase any pre-existing baryon asymmetry when being combined with the
non-perturbative B+L violating sphaleron processes present within the Stan-
dard Model [21]. This reasoning seems to exclude lepton number violation
in the range where sphaleron processes are active (unless the lepton number
violation is directly related to the origin of the baryon asymmetry such as
in vanilla-type leptogenesis models [23]), thereby ruling out many attractive
neutrino mass models. The conclusions holds, however, only as long as one is
concentrating only on leptons and baryons. In asymmetric dark matter models
the production of baryons and dark matter is related - offering a possibility to
explain Finetuning problem 4. With respect to the inconsistency of successful
baryogenesis and lepton number violation, such models supply the early Uni-
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verse with a ”third reservoir” (leptons and baryons plus dark matter) to the
cosmic soup and thereby invalidate the argument introduced above [24]. This
simple example demonstrates that what looks like finetuned and inconsistent
when concentrating on a subsystem (leptons and baryons), may turn out to
be perfectly natural when looking at the total system (leptons, baryons and
dark matter). While a pencil balancing on its tip seems unnatural, the pencil’s
state can be explained naturally when including the writer’s hand holding it.
Although the subsystem (pencil) seems to behave unnatural, the total system
(pencil + hand) is not.
But how is the total system related to the fundamental theory supposed
to explain the unlikely coincidences understood as Finetuning problems on
the effective level of description? In the following we will argue that the most
fundamental level of description is indeed represented by the state of the total
system rather than by the states of constituents. To come to this conclusion,
we will develop a consistent notion of a fundamental theory. In this context
we can argue consistently that quantum mechanics suggests that this funda-
mental theory can only be the Universe itself. Finally, we will come back to
the problem of Naturalness from this perspective.
3 What is Fundamental?
”There is only one world, the natural world... There are many ways of talking
about the world... Our purposes in the moment determine the best way of
talking.” (Sean Carroll, [25])
We don’t live in a single reality - we live in many realities. And maybe
exactly this feature is what makes us human. As the Israeli historian Yuval
Noah Harari argues:
”...the truly unique feature of our language is not its ability to transmit
information about men and lions. Rather, it’s the ability to transmit informa-
tion about things that do not exist at all... It’s relatively easy to agree that only
Homo sapiens can speak about things that don’t really exist, and believe six im-
possible things before breakfast... law, money, gods, nations.... Any large-scale
human cooperation – whether a modern state, a medieval church, an ancient
city or an archaic tribe – is rooted in common myths that exist only in people’s
collective imagination. The kinds of things that people create through this net-
work of stories are known in academic circles as ’fictions’, ’social constructs’
or ’imagined realities’... The ability to create an imagined reality out of words
enabled large numbers of strangers to cooperate effectively... This opened a fast
lane of cultural evolution, bypassing the traffic jams of genetic evolution” [26].
Without any doubt this hypothesis is intriguing. But can we really deny
entities such as money, stock corporations or law to be part of reality? After
all, a lack of money, a crash at the stock market or a violation of law can get us
in serious trouble. Moreover, if Harari argues such social constructs exist only
in people’s imagination, what about people themselves? What about biological
organisms?
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When Erwin Schro¨dinger tried to define life, he described it as a property
[27]:
”What is the characteristic feature of life? When is a piece of matter said
to be alive? When it goes on ’doing something’, moving, exchanging material
with its environment, and so forth, and that for a much longer period than
we would expect an inanimate piece of matter to ’keep going’ under similar
circumstances.”
Schro¨dinger’s characterization of life by fiat of its striking stability sup-
ported the hypothesis of an hereditary molecule which paved the way for the
field of molecular biology and later on motivated James Watson and Francis
Crick to decode the structure of DNA [28]. Moreover, it defines life by its
functionality rather than by its material basis, as an information processing
routine rather than an object in space and time. This view is supported by
the fact that over a typical human lifespan most atoms in the human body
will be replaced without altering the identity of the individual. In this sense
biological organisms resemble much more things we call social constructs than
matter itself. So after all, if we deny corporations to be part of reality we have
to deny reality to ourselves as well.
Once we embrace the concept of many realities, on the other hand, new
questions arise. Philosophers talk about weak or strong emergence when the
natural laws of one level of description (such as biology) can not - either
in practice or fundamentally - be derived from laws on a more fundamental
level such as physics. While the existence of weak emergence is unchallenged -
nobody wants to describe the stock market by calculating the behavior of the
elementary particles involved - accepting strong emergence on the other hand
is not quite different from believing in miracles. After all, if phenomena on
a higher, more complex level are not even in principle describable on a more
fundamental level, then the fundamental level does also not constrain the space
of possibilities of the higher level. For example, if the fact that particles can’t
propagate faster than light does not imply that also biological organisms can’t
travel faster than light, there is also nothing which prevents Jesus from walking
on water. Any extrapolation of known physical laws, meaning any application
of these laws in new situations, would become questionable. In this case the
entire scientific endeavor wouldn’t make sense any more.
Once we exclude the possibility of strong emergence it is clear that not all
realities are equally fundamental. Rather the more fundamental realities con-
strain the space of possibilities for the higher levels: While more fundamental
realities or natural laws are still valid on higher levels, more complex or higher
descriptions have a limited range of applicability when being extrapolated to
more fundamental constituents. This view suggests a hierarchy of sciences sim-
ilar to the one postulated by the french philosopher Auguste Comte. In this
hierarchy physics defines the foundation, chemistry is the physics of the outer
atomic orbits, biology deals with the chemistry of complex organic molecules,
psychology describes the biology of the neural system and sociology and eco-
nomics discuss the psychology of large numbers of individuals.
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While it has been pointed out recently by Erik P. Hoel and collaborators
[29,30], that higher levels of description may actually be more deterministic
(a typical example is that macroscopic classical physics appears to be more
deterministic than microscopic quantum mechanics), it seems clear that re-
alities are the more fundamental, the more observer-independent they are.
Conversely, higher layers of description are typically build on concepts which
are more substrate independent, relying more on the processing of informa-
tion than on the properties of their actual constituents and in this sense are
also more idealized. Obviously the science of sociology makes only sense from
a viewpoint which accepts the existence of biological organisms beforehand,
while particle physics in contrast does not rely on any such premise.
Already at this point however we realize that we have to revise our tradi-
tional concept of reductionism. Once we reduce sociology and psychology to
biology it is obvious that reductionism can no longer be understood as a ma-
terialistic approach, but rather a concept in information theory: Rather than
identifying constituents, reductionism reduces complex systems by identifying
the most relevant degrees of freedom on the higher layer of reality with respect
to the degrees of freedom on a more fundamental level.
4 Zeh versus Democritus
Naively the above mentioned scheme seems to suggest an ontology based on
particles, a traditional reductionist view in which ever smaller constituents
determine the properties of the higher, more complex layers. An ontology re-
sembling the lore of the the pre-socratic Greek philosopher Democritus: ”Only
the atoms and the void are real”[31]. Such an ontology would indeed be appro-
priate for a classical world. In quantum mechanics, however, this notion fails,
as has been emphasized by H. Dieter Zeh [32]: ”There are no quantum jumps,
nor are there particles!”. As Zeh points out: ”Quantum theory does not require
the existence of discontinuities: neither in time (quantum jumps), nor in space
(particles), nor in spacetime (quantum events). These apparent discontinuities
are readily described objectively by the continuous process of decoherence.”
The process of decoherence, discovered by Zeh in 1970 [33], describes a
phenomenon which is well understood theoretically and experimentally con-
firmed [34]: Whenever a quantum system is measured or coupled to its envi-
ronment, the system gets entangled with both observer and environment. As
the environment is not totally known to the observer, this leads to the loss
of information about the quantum system getting delocalized into the envi-
ronment. As a consequence, quantum superpositions – such as Schro¨dinger’s
infamous undead cat [35] – decay rapidly and quasi-classical objects such as
particles with a definite location emerge. An intuitive metaphor for the process
of decoherence is the action of a colored optical lens. While it seems that such
a lens adds color to the colorless sunlight, in truth the lens works by absorbing
all other component colors being present in the white, colorless state. Just like
8 Heinrich Pa¨s
decoherence, a colored lens seemingly creates information by actually filtering
out information.
Note, that quantum mechanics is understood here as a paradigm, not as
a reference to first-quantized particle quantum mechanics. In this sense quan-
tum field theory (which indeed can be understood as the physics of an array of
coupled quantum-mechanical harmonic oscillators is an example of quantum
mechanics at work. Any deeper understanding of the meaning of quantum
mechanics will also apply to quantum field theory. In rapport with Zeh’s un-
derstanding, particles are usually understood as field excitations in quantum
field theory. Moreover, as exposed by the Unruh effect [36], particles are not
observer-independent entities: According to quantum field theory an acceler-
ated observer should observe a blackbody radiation in vacuo. (More accurately,
particle number is not observer-independent. Attributes of the quantum field
such as rest mass, spin, and other quantum numbers of course are.)
Adopting Occam’s razor, one can assume now, that the process of decoher-
ence is entirely responsible for the quantum-to-classical transition which leads
to various decohered quasi-classical realities, the so-called Everett branches
[37]. This interpretation of the quantum measurement process is usually known
as the Many-Worlds-Interpretation, Many-Minds-Interpretation or Universal
Quantum Mechanics.
5 A crisis of reductionism?
These observations expose two interesting facts which are usually overlooked
in the traditional notion of reductionism:
First, according to quantum theory, at some point the naive notion of
reductionism, in the sense that emergent properties of higher layers of de-
scription can be at least in principle explained by the properties of isolated
constituents, breaks down, as the mere existence of these constituents itself
turns out to be a consequence of isolating the corresponding degrees of freedom
from their environment. In other words, the existence of particles is a conse-
quence of a specific perspective: Whenever a particle is observed, the quantum
field gets coupled to the measurement device and its unknown environment.
It is this interaction and the information loss that implies that the state of
the quantum field is observed as a particle. Particles thus are a consequence
of decoherence. Particles are, as Zeh argues consistently, emergent themselves
(in the sense that a description in terms of constituents neglects information
about the entangled total system).
And second, while more fundamental concepts or realities seem on one
hand to be more observer-independent, they are on the other hand often not
directly observable anymore. In quantum mechanics, the quantum mechanical
wave function is unanimous for any observer, while a definite classical result of
a measurement applies to one specific Everett branch, only. Another example
is the fundamental role symmetries play for example in particle physics. As
has been argued by Werner Heisenberg in 1932 [38], the protons and neutrons
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constituting the atomic nucleus behave so similar that they can be understood
as two states of a single particle – in analogy to a quantum spin which can
point up and down. Heisenberg thus described proton and neutron together as
the two possible states of an isospin doublet. Curiously, this way the apparent
material difference of proton and neutron is reduced to the information about
the state of the isospin Q-Bit.
Over the last decades, particle physicists mostly followed a paradigm sug-
gesting that a more fundamental description corresponds to more symmetry.
The concept of a Grand Unified Theory, for example, generalized Heisenbergs
isospin symmetry, described by the Lie group SU(2) to enlarged groups such
as SU(5) [39] or SO(10) [40] where all fundamental matter constituents are
understood as different states of one or two basic representations (”basic”
does not necessarily refer to the fundamental representation, here. In SO(10)
GUTs the basic representation is the 16-dimensional spinor representation,
in SU(5), it refers to the fundamental and the antisymmetric 10-dimensional
representations.).
Now, do these observations imply that the paradigm of reductionism is
in trouble? It isn’t, once we decide to understand reductionism as an infor-
mation theoretic approach. As has been argued above, on the one hand this
decision shifts many phenomena usually understood as materialistic – such as
the properties of elementary particles – into the immaterial realm of informa-
tion. On the other hand, so far there is no evidence that information can exist
without a material medium or carrier. Quite contrary, whenever we encounter
information this information seems to depend on how we interpret or view a
materialistic object: We simply cannot extract a Beethoven symphony from a
USB stick without a device which can read out the stick and process the data
format appropriately.
So while the relations between information and matter are subtle, our
perspective onto the world seems to play a crucial role, here.
6 How to quantify fundamentality?
Let us come back now to the original question: What is fundamental? As we
have seen, fundamental descriptions in modern physics sacrifice the require-
ment of direct observability for the sake of an observer-independent descrip-
tion. But how can observer-independence of a theory be quantified?
To discuss this point, we turn to the prototypical example of an emergent
theory: thermodynamics in its incarnation as statistical mechanics. In thermo-
dynamics, states such as gases or liquids are described by parameters or state
functions such as temperature, pressure or volume. These state functions are
not fundamental in the sense that they do not correspond to a specific configu-
ration of the constituent atoms or molecules (a so-called ”microstate”), but to
a statistical average of microstates known as ”macrostate”. For example, the
temperature of a macrostate can be related to the average energy of the con-
stituent microstates. The normalized logarithm of the number of microstates
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corresponding to a given macrostate is known as entropy. Thus entropy can
be understood as the missing information to identify the exact microstate in a
given macrostate and determines how probable the macrostate is. According
to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy also determines the direction
of thermodynamic out-of-equilibrium processes (towards higher entropy) and
thus establishes an (or presumable the) arrow of time of the Universe.
The concept of entropy also allows us to find a concept of fundamentality
which is more general than the spoiled constituent concept of traditional re-
ductionism. A microstate is fundamental, a macrostate is not. Consequently,
the fundamental state of the Universe has zero-entropy (and is arguably time-
less). In fact, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation [41] of canonical quantum gravity
describes a timeless Universe on the fundamental level [42,43].
Turning back to quantum mechanics, it is well known that in the quantum-
to-classical transition the von-Neumann entropy increases as a consequence of
the information loss into the environment. Thus the fundamental state of the
Universe can not be a constituent, it has to be the total entangled system
of observer, measured system, and environment, also known as the quantum
Universe itself. Similar conclusions have been drawn previously from a philoso-
pher’s perspective by Jonathan Schaffer [44] and elaborated recently by Clau-
dio Calosi [45] under the term ”quantum monism”.
7 Lessons for the search for a Theory of Everything
The realization that no local constituent can really be fundamental leads to
several interesting consequences for our search for a Theory of Everything
(TOE). As such a TOE should identify the fundamental reality of the Uni-
verse, it should be questioned whether the traditional reductionist approach
– which so far beyond any question was amazingly successful – will be still
promising once we approach the fundamental level of reality. Will the hierar-
chy of sciences starting from Sociology and Economy, over Psychology, Biology,
Chemistry to Atomic physics, Nuclear Physics and Particle Physics will con-
tinue towards String Theory, where particles are described as excitations of
localized, one-dimensional objects? Or will it be more promising to try to de-
rive the Standard Model of particle physics directly from a non-local concept
such as the wave function of the Universe in Quantum Cosmology? Indeed,
in my opinion strings do not qualify as a fundamental description of the Uni-
verse. String Theory, however, has also given rise to a variety of non-local
concepts which could indeed be instrumental in establishing a description in
terms of a unique fundamental quantum state, such as gauge-gravity dual-
ity, holographic screens and gravity emerging from entanglement. Could this
be obtained by identifying our perspective onto the Universe, by realizing that:
Reality = Universe + Perspective
and that
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Fundamental Reality = Universe without Perspective?
Can the notion of information being processed in higher layers of reality be
traced back to this perspective? 2
Or, phrased as ideas to inspire an experimental program:
Can the entanglement of the Quantum Universe be verified by finding un-
expected correlations, similar to the ones found in EPR [46] like experiments,
for example in the Cosmic Microwave Background [47]? Is our perspective onto
the Universe related to the way our consciousness works [48], for example if
we can show that consciousness is a by-product of a certain algorithm running
on the localized degrees of freedom in our brains? How for example would the
Universe look like for example for an alien intelligence whose consciousness
may be a product of an algorithm running on momentum eigenstates such as
plane waves? Quite obviously, in this case decoherence may converge towards a
different ”preferred basis” [49]. And finally, are symmetries as a concept based
on invariance related to us observing a macrostate and thus only seemingly
observer-independent [50,51]? Or is the fundamental reality totally symmetric
and thus essentially featureless [52] and everything we observe in the Universe
turns out to be a consequence of information which can eventually be traced
back to our perspective onto the Universe?
8 A fundamental Universe
To summarize, the question ”what is fundamental?” leads to interesting in-
sights about the notion of reality. As we argued above, a consistent concept
of reductionism has to interpret the reduction of higher levels of reality such
as societies or life into lower levels such as atoms or quantum fields as an
information theoretic approach where more fundamental layers of reality are
characterized by lower entropy. On the one hand information itself is imma-
terial - people have been killed by rocks but nobody ever has been killed by
a Beethoven symphony (unless for example it was scribbled on a rock). On
the other hand, information relies - as far as we know - on a material carrier
and depends on the perspective of the observer. The question which proper-
ties of the Universe are related to information and which ones are related to
matter may well be one of the most pressing problems dominating physics
and information science of the 21st century. If some fundamental carrier of
information exists, it probably will be possible to be traced back to the funda-
mental level of reality, itself, the zero-entropy microstate which according to
quantum physics - at least as far as quantum mechanics is universally appli-
cable – is the quantum state of the Universe itself. Such a state would include
not only the visible Universe, dark matter and dark energy and other possible
2 textcolorredWhat is meant here is that observer-independence corresponds to a descrip-
tion that does not rely on a specific perspective. This does not imply that there are no
observers.
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parallel Universes which could be produced in primordial inflation [53], it also
includes other possible realities corresponding to different Everett branches
and all their superpositions. Everything above would dissolve in a single en-
tity described by an entangled quantum state which only from a certain, local
perspective would look like a network of interacting quantum fields and par-
ticles. If the statement that the fundamental layer of reality is the Universe
itself sounds tautological, that is, since the ’Universe’ usually is understood as
a multiplicity of things, including particles, fields, stars, planets and lifeforms.
On the contrary, the fundamental Universe is a single entity which only looks
like many things as perceived through the lens of decoherence. Physics is ap-
proaching Metaphysics here, and who wants can find interesting parallels to
the concept of such an all-encompassing reality for example in the philosophy
of Neoplatonism, east asian philosophies or religion.
9 Fine Tuning and Perspective in an Entangled Quantum Universe
We now are finally coming back to the Finetuning problem of the Standard
Model and the issue of Naturalness as a guiding principe. So far we have ar-
gued that in order to discuss whether unlikely coincidences on an effective
level of description are resolved in a more fundamental theory, one first has
to specify what ”fundamental” really means. This discussion led to the con-
clusion that the fundamental description of the Universe has to be a single,
entangled quantum state. But is this observation really helpful to deal with
the Finetuning problems encountered in particle physics and cosmology? This
is admittedly hard to say. There exist, however, a few hints that indeed point
towards the existence of such a relationship which will be summarized in the
following.
The main point advocated in this essay is that the Finetuning problems in
our best theories are not so much deficits of a or a group of specific theories
bur rather a symptom of the concept of ”fundamentality” underlying these
theories. In the following we will try to make this statement somewhat more
precise: We will provide some arguments for the conclusion that the nature
of Naturalness problems may hint at an insufficient understanding of quan-
tum mechanics, that the likely existence of a multiverse does not necessarily
suggest anthropic reasoning, and that first concrete examples of the suggested
paradigm shift can be observed already in recent approaches to quantum grav-
ity.
– First, we observe that the notion of Naturalness is strongly related to
the concept of effective field theories: In this context the possibility to
integrate out short-distance degrees of freedom allows to describe large
scale physics without knowing the exact UV completion. This implies that
Naturalness is strongly related to the question whether physics at large
and small scales can be separated and described independently. Conversely,
quantum physics and in particular entanglement are inherently non-local:
For entangled systems, the small subsystems are emergent upon the total
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large system. The fact that an absence of Naturalness is on one hand related
to a genuine quantum phenomenon such as renormalization and that it
spoils the separation of scales by integrating out short-distance degrees
of freedom in effective field theories while on the other hand quantum
physics has inherent non-local properties could point towards an insufficient
understanding of quantum mechanics as the underlying problem. After all,
quantum mechanics has been hurriedly applied to many phenomena in
solid states and atomic, nuclear and particle physics without finding an
interpretation generally agreed on.
– Next, while universal quantum mechanics predicts a multiverse of alter-
native realities or Everett branches, that doesn’t mean that it necessarily
suggests anthropic explanations for fundamental laws of Nature. Of course
a dolphin may argue righteously that it lives in the sea since it couldn’t
survive for long outside of water. But there exists a more profound expla-
nation why the dolphin encounters water in its environment which relies on
the origin of elements in Big Bang and Supernova nucleosynthesis, chem-
istry, structure formation, Earth’s gravitational pull and its distance to
the sun. Similarly, quantum mechanics can give rise to seemingly unlikely
correlations which nevertheless are explained by a global property of an
entangled state.
Consider, for example, the EPR correlations [46] of the Bell singlet state,
|ψs〉 = | ↑↓〉 − | ↓↑〉. (1)
When measuring the polarization of one of the constituent spins every re-
sult is equally likely. For example, when measuring the first spin along
the z-axis two Everett branches emerge, one with spin up and one with
spin down, and the observer will find herself with an equal probability of
50% in either of these branches. Both alternatives are realized in the Ev-
erettian quantum multiverse. However, when comparing measurements on
both constituent spins, while their individual directions remain undeter-
mined, they will always add up to zero in any Everett branch. Thus it is
obvious that even in multiverse scenarios there typically exists ”physics
beyond the multiverse”, meaning global properties that are realized in any
of the parallel universes - at least in the context of the Many Worlds In-
terpretation. Moreover, as has been mentioned above, recently Nomura,
Susskind, Bousso and others have argued that the quantum multiverse
and the multiverse arising in chaotic inflation (realizing the String The-
ory landscape) could turn out to be one and the same thing [16,15,16,17].
In this case the argument favoring physics beyond the multiverse applies
equally well for other bubble universes in cosmology and competing String
Theory vacua.
– Finally, there exists a first interesting, recent approach which seems to
derive successfully seemingly fundamental aspects of Nature as emergent
properties arising by observing a subsystem of an entangled quantum state:
As Mark van Raamsdonk has recently pointed out, spacetime geometry can
be derived from the entanglement entropy of a quantum field theory defined
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on the boundary of the spacetime considered [54]. In this context, van
Raamsdonks work provides an interesting and promising example pointing
out concretely how physics could emerge from entanglement. It is thus a
concrete example how a theory building on the ideas developed in this
paper could look like. While many open questions remain, it is conceivable
that a similar mechanism could give rise, for example, to gauge symmetries.
In this case van Raamsdonk’s and other’s related work could be the first
harbinger of a paradigm shift related to our notion of what should be
understood as a fundamental theory.
10 Summary
This paper tries to provoke a fresh view onto the problem whether - and if
so how - Naturalness and Finetuning can guide us in our search for a fun-
damental description of Nature. It argues that this endeavor should not so
much concentrate on desired features of a fundamental theory but rather on
what qualifies a theory as fundamental in the first place. In this context zero-
entropy is argued for as the most relevant criterion for fundamentality and
it is shown that - adopting a universal validity of quantum mechanics - only
the Universe itself, understood as a single, entangled quantum state, can be
considered as fundamental. The suggestion that the total rather than the con-
stituent system represents the fundamental description of Nature may turn
out to be highly relevant for the discussion of Naturalness and Finetuning,
since there exist many examples where what looks finetuned or inconsistent
when analyzing a subsytem turns out to be totally natural when looking at the
total system instead. It thus should be critically scrutinized whether the quest
for a fundamental theory should commence from the viewpoint of quantum
cosmology rather than with particles or strings, and whether particle physics
could be derived from entanglement and the observer’s perspective onto the
total, fundamental quantum state of the Universe. Recent success in describ-
ing spacetime geometry as a consequence of entanglement entropy [54] suggest
that such an approach may indeed be promising. As Gian Giudice has argued
[55]: ”we live in times of great uncertainties the best moments for scientific
revolutions to happen... we are confronted with the need to reconsider the guid-
ing principles that have been used for decades to address the most fundamental
questions about the physical world”. It is quite possible that the dawn of such
a paradigm shift is already breaking.
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